Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules

Mostapha Diss

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Abstract: We provide exact relations giving the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation of three specific social choice functions (Borda rule, Copeland rule, Plurality rule) in three-alternative elections when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed. We use each type of tie-breaking rule in the case of three-candidate election in order to make the results more robust. Analyzing our probabilities, we can point out that the probability of individual and coalitional manipulation tend to vanish significantly when the notion of self-selectivity is imposed.

Keywords: Voting rules; Self-selectivity; Stability Analysis; Manipulability; Probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2015, 229 (1), pp.347-376. ⟨10.1007/s10479-014-1763-7⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (2015)
Working Paper: Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules (2013)
Working Paper: Strategic manipulability of self-­selective social choice rules (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01136401

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-014-1763-7

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