Coalitions of Actors and Managerial Innovations in the Healthcare and Social Healthcare Sector

Gulliver Lux () and Nicolas Petit ()
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Gulliver Lux: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Nicolas Petit: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper studies the behavior of a variety of stakeholders around the adoption of managerial innovations desired by operational managers of health services institutions. We show that if the operational manager may cause the managerial innovation, the tool prospective is subject to power games around coalitions of actors. The study of several management situations in health services institutions enables us, using the game theory, to highlight the "winning", "losing" and "uncertain" coalitions that can achieve operational management within the establishment to settle a managerial innovation.

Keywords: coalition; game theory; power games; Managerial innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Public Organization Review, 2016, 16 (2), pp.251-268. ⟨10.1007/s11115-015-0304-4⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01141326

DOI: 10.1007/s11115-015-0304-4

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