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Le critère du bien-être du consommateur comme objectif exclusif de la politique de concurrence: une mise en perspective sur la base de l’histoire de l’Antitrust américain

Frédéric Marty

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Abstract: According to the European Commission competition law enforcement has to be based on an effects-based approach. This one, already implemented by U.S. Antitrust enforcers, is inspired by the Chicago School. In accordance with this approach consumer welfare must be the exclusive criterion to take into account to assess the lawfulness of a given market practice. We consider the history of the U.S. Antitrust in order to analyse the processes by which this view has become predominant and to put into evidence that alternative criteria, as distributive justice or the control of private economic power, have been or may be selected in competition with the consumer welfare one

Keywords: competition policy; U.S. Antitrust; consumer welfare standard; efficiency; distributive justice; market power; politique de concurrence; antitrust américain; critère du bien-être du consommateur; efficience; justice distributive; pouvoir de marché. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05-02
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Published in Revue internationale de droit économique, 2015, 2014 (4), pp.271-297

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