Pushing the Tipping in International Environmental Agreements

Lorenzo Cerda Planas ()
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Lorenzo Cerda Planas: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: This paper intends to provide an alternative approach to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEA). The existing consensus within the literature is that there are either too few signatories or that the emissions of signatories are almost the same as business as usual (BAU). I start from a well-known model (Barrett 1997), adding heterogeneity in countries' marginal abatement costs (low and high) and in damages suffered (or corresponding environmental concern). I also allow for technological transfers and border taxes. I show that using either mechanism one at a time, does not change the results. But if both are used in a strategic manner, a grand (and abating) coalition can be reached, while minimizing transfers.

Keywords: self-enforcing environmental agreements; border tax; tipping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-res
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01163935v1
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Published in 2015

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01163935

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