The effect of remittances prior to an election

Jean-Louis Combes, Christian Hubert Ebeke (cebeke@imf.org) and Mathilde Maurel

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Abstract: The objective of the article is to assess whether remittances have an influence on political manipulation, which may occur prior to an election, through an increase in the government consumption-to-GDP ratio. We combine data from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy data set compiled and discussed in Hyde and Marinov (2012) and the World Development Indicators data set. We focus on 70 developing countries over the period 1990–2010. It appears that the political budget cycle is reduced up to the point where it is fully cancelled out at a remittance threshold of 10.7% of GDP. Those findings are robust to different robustness checks.

Keywords: Remittances; Political Business Cycles (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-03-23
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01167208v2
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Applied Economics, 2015, 47 (38), pp.4074-4089. ⟨10.1080/00036846.2015.1023945⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: The effect of remittances prior to an election (2015)
Working Paper: The effect of remittances prior to an election (2015)
Working Paper: he effect of remittances prior to an election (2015)
Working Paper: The effect of remittances prior to an election (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01167208

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2015.1023945

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