Optimal monetary provisions and risk aversion in plural form franchise networks; a theoretical model of incentives with heterogeneous agents

Muriel Fadairo (), Cintya Lanchimba and M. Yangari
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Muriel Fadairo: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Keywords: Franchising network; risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-12-03
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Published in 7th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks, Dec 2015, Cape Town, South Africa

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01219940

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