The Winner's Curse in Sports Economics

Wladimir Andreff (andreff@univ-paris1.fr)
Additional contact information
Wladimir Andreff: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: A sports entity often maximizes its monopoly rent in creating an auction-like situation among competing agents for its exclusive product. The latter overbid up to the most optimistic bidder's price. Here comes the winner's curse whenever the market value of the auctioned object is unknown ex ante. The most optimistic bidder wins the bid and its actual net revenues will be lower than expected. A winner's curse occurs in bids for hosting a mega-sporting event, when several cities compete to host a team franchise, TV channels bid for a league's broadcasting rights, and teams overbid for recruiting a same free agent or superstar player. Keywords

Keywords: winner's curse; auction; bid; sporting events; TV broadcasting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01243890
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Oliver Budzinski, Arne Feddersen. Contemporary Research in Sports Economics, 14, Peter Lang, pp.177-205, 2014, Political Economics, Competititon and Regulation, 978-3-631-64657-1

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01243890/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01243890

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD (hal@ccsd.cnrs.fr).