The Choice of voting structure for privatizing a Company

Christian At and Pierre-Henri Morand ()

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Abstract: We study the role of security-voting structure when a government wants to privatize a company. Our results show that the one share–one vote structure is optimal for allocating control rights to the most efficient pretender. However, this structure is not always optimal for maximizing the sale's revenue.

Keywords: Security-voting structure; Corporate control; Auctions; Privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Published in Economics Letters, 2000, 68 (3), pp.287-292

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Journal Article: The choice of the voting structure for privatizing a company (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01309050

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