Bargaining through Approval

Matias Nuñez and Jean-François Laslier

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Abstract: The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.

Keywords: Two-agents; Approval Voting; Partial honesty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01310223v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2015, 60, pp.63-73. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015⟩

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Journal Article: Bargaining through Approval (2015)
Working Paper: Bargaining through Approval (2015)
Working Paper: Bargaining through Approval (2015)
Working Paper: Bargaining through Approval (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01310223

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015

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