Optimal Apportionment

Yukio Koriyama, Antonin Macé, Rafael Treibich and Jean-François Laslier

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Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical foundation that supports the degressive proportionality principle in apportionment problems, such as the allocation of seats in a federal parliament. The utility assigned by an individual to a constitutional rule is a function of the frequency with which each collective decision matches the individual's own will. The core of the argument is that, if the function is concave, then classical utilitarianism at the social level recommends decision rules that exhibit degressive proportionality with respect to the population size.

Keywords: federal parliament; theoretical foundation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in Journal of Political Economy, 2013, 121 (3), pp.584-608

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Apportionment (2013)
Working Paper: Optimal Apportionment (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01321784

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