Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and their Subclass of Data Games

Sylvain Béal, Philippe Solal and Marc Deschamps

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Keywords: Balanced collective contributions; Data games; Shapley value; Equal allocation of non-separable costs; Balanced contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2016, 18 (6), pp. 992-1004

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Journal Article: Comparable Axiomatizations of Two Allocation Rules for Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility and Their Subclass of Data Games (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01328888

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