The Trade-Off between Risk and Royalties in Franchise Contracting

Muriel Fadairo (), Cintya Lanchimba and Josef Windsperger
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Muriel Fadairo: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Josef Windsperger: Department of Business Administration - Universität Wien = University of Vienna

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Keywords: Contractual design; Risk-incentives relationship; Royalty rate; Franchising (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-06-27
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Published in 65ème Meeting Annuel de l’Association Française d’Economie, Jun 2016, Nancy, France

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Working Paper: The Trade-Off between Risk and Royalties in Franchise Contracting (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01352085

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