Parking enforcement and urban road congestion. A theoretical outlook

Répression du stationnement frauduleux et congestion routière urbaine. Une approche théorique

Romain Petiot ()
Additional contact information
Romain Petiot: LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - ENTPE - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: The article deals with a non-free parking violation economic analysis. Based on a parking behavior model, the analysis rests on the economics of crime principles. The results show that the choice of the fine level has an impact both on the travel demand and on the modal share. In particular in the case of hypercongestion, the increase in the fine brings the risk-neutral user an advantage of driving and breaking the parking law. This result leads to reject the consensual policy, which prescribes the systematic increase in the fine to deter the parking meter non-compliance within the framework of the travel calming policy. Those results are confirmed by the numerical simulations.

Keywords: public economics; transport economics; congestion; pricing; economics of crime; illegal behavior; économie publique; économie des transports; tarification; économie du crime; comportement illégal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, 2002, avril (2), pp.275-298. ⟨10.3917/reru.022.027⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01360323

DOI: 10.3917/reru.022.027

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().