The Core for Games with Cooperation Structure

Inés Gallego, Michel Grabisch, Andres Jiménez-Losada () and Alexandre Skoda ()
Additional contact information
Inés Gallego: Universidad de Sevilla = University of Seville
Andres Jiménez-Losada: Universidad de Sevilla = University of Seville
Alexandre Skoda: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: A cooperative game consists of a set of players and a characteristic function that determines the maximal profit or minimal cost that each subset of players can get when they decide to cooperate, regardless of the actions of the rest of the players. The relationships among the players can modify their bargaining and therefore their payoffs. The model of cooperation structures in a game introduces a graph on the set of players setting their relations and in which its components indicate the groups of players that are initially formed. In this paper we define the core and the Weber set and the notion of convexity for this family of games.

Keywords: Cooperative game; A priori unions; Core; Weber set; Cooperation structure; Convexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Ngoc Thanh Nguyen, Ryszard Kowalczyk, Jacek Mercik. Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp.172-188, 2016, 978-3-662-52885-3. ⟨10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_12⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Core for Games with Cooperation Structure (2016)
Working Paper: The Core for Games with Cooperation Structure (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01395957

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_12

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().