Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia: What Lessons from International Experiences

Sami Debbichi and Walid Hichri
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Sami Debbichi: AEDD - Analyse Economique et Développement Durable - UTM - Tunis El Manar University [University of Tunis El Manar] [Tunisia] = Université de Tunis El Manar [Tunisie] = جامعة تونس المنار (ar)

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Abstract: We try in this paper to characterize the state of mobile phone market in Tunisia. Our study is based on a survey of foreign experience (Europe) in detecting collusive behavior and a comparison of the critical threshold of collusion between operators in developing countries like Tunisia. The market power is estimated based on the work of Parker Roller (1997) and the assumption of "Balanced Calling Pattern". We use then the model of Friedman (1971) to compare the critical threshold of collusion. We show that the "conduct parameter" measuring the intensity of competition is not null during the period 1993-2011. Results show also that collusion is easier on the Tunisian market that on the Algerian, Jordanian, or Moroccan one.

Keywords: Termination rate; Market power; Competition; Mobile phone Market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Published in Journal of Research in Business, Economics and Management, 2016, 7 (1), pp. 1031-1040

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Related works:
Working Paper: Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia: What Lessons from International Experiences (2014)
Working Paper: Market Power and Collusion on Interconnection Phone Market in Tunisia: What Lessons from International Experiences (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01419495

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