Pay policy and organizational design of French cooperatives: questioning incentive theory

Jean-Yves Juban (), Olivier Boissin (), Hervé Charmettant () and Yvan Renou ()
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Jean-Yves Juban: CERAG - Centre d'études et de recherches appliquées à la gestion - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]
Olivier Boissin: CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]
Hervé Charmettant: CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]
Yvan Renou: CREG - Centre de recherche en économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]

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Abstract: In this article we study the organizational structure of cooperatives (Jensen and Meckling, 1992), in particular the way in which pay incentives may encourage employees to adopt the strategy of their firm. Based on the findings of a field study we assert that pay plays a minor role in cooperatives, although these organizations perform efficiently, even in a period of economic crisis. Organization theory leads us to conclude that pay incentives are not effective in cooperatives whereas delegation is a strong pillar. As for control, its use varies; indeed it is sometimes resisted by managers. Complementary approaches have enabled us to identify new ways of understanding the institutional complexity of cooperatives.

Keywords: Organizational structure; pay incentives; pay; cooperative enterprises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Published in RIMHE : Revue Interdisciplinaire Management, Homme(s) & Entreprise, 2016, 5 (24), pp.25-44. ⟨10.3917/rimhe.024.0025⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01429704

DOI: 10.3917/rimhe.024.0025

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