Taxation, corruption, and growth
Ufuk Akcigit (),
Julia Cagé () and
William Kerr ()
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Philippe Aghion: CDF - Collège de France - Collège de France, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics, Department of Economics, Harvard University
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We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.
Keywords: Entrepreneurship; Corruption; Endogenous growth; Taxation; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in European Economic Review, Elsevier, 2016, 86, pp.24-51. <10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.01.012>
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Journal Article: Taxation, corruption, and growth (2016)
Working Paper: Taxation, Corruption, and Growth (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01496936
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