Managers et espions

Hervé Laroche and Christelle Théron
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Hervé Laroche: ESCP-EAP - ESCP-EAP - Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Paris
Christelle Théron: CRM - Centre de Recherche en Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - IAE - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In 2011, the French car manufacturer Renault suddenly fires three managers suspected of spying. These executives were in fact innocent. Such an astounding mistake of decision-making (the most visible feature of this case) conceals several underlying deviant processes: organizational paranoia, follow-up of inadequate actions fed by secrecy and lie, development of micro-institutions with deviant practices. Such processes invite us to think about possible pitfalls organizational actors are likely to be trapped into.

Keywords: decision making; organizational paranoia; secrecy; lies; the Renault affair; déviance; décision; paranoïa organisationnelle; secret; mensonges; L’affaire Renault (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Published in Revue Française de Gestion, 2016, 42 (254), pp.37 - 51. ⟨10.3166/rfg.2016.00014⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01521338

DOI: 10.3166/rfg.2016.00014

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