Dichotomous multi-type games with a coalition structure

Sébastien Courtin (), Zéphirin Nganmeni () and Bertrand Tchantcho ()
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Sébastien Courtin: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Zéphirin Nganmeni: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Bertrand Tchantcho: ENSPY - Ecole Nationale Supérieure Polytechnique de Yaoundé - UY1 - Université de Yaoundé I

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Abstract: This work focuses on the evaluation of voting power in dichotomous multi-type games endowed with a coalition structure. Dichotomous multi-type games, introduced by Courtin et al. [2016], model games in which there is a number of non-ordered types of support in the input, while the output is dichotomous, i.e. the proposal is either accepted or rejected. In a game with a coalition structure, it is supposed that players organize themselves into disjoint coalitions wich are defined a priori. We extend the well-known Owen index (Owen [1977]) and Banzhaf-Owen index (Owen [1981]) to this class of games. A full characterization of these power indices is provided.

Keywords: Dichotomous multi-type games; Coalition structure; Owen power index; Banzhaf-Owen power index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01545772v1
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Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, 86, pp.9-17. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.003⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01545772

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.003

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