Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues
Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline (),
Jean-Christophe Poudou () and
Sébastien Roussel ()
Post-Print from HAL
To address the issue of potential information asymmetries inherent in the estimation of deforestation baselines required by the current Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation+ (REDD+) scheme, we offer a theoretical analysis of an extended scheme relying on the theory of incentives. We compare two types of contracts: a deforestation-based contract and a policy-based contract. Each of them implies a dramatically different information rent/efficiency trade-off due to domestic implementation and transaction costs. If the contract is deforestation-based (resp. policy-based), information rents are awarded to countries with the ex ante lowest (resp. highest) intended deforestation. We show that a general contract can be offered to recipient countries in which the type of instrument proposed is endogenous, independent of the historical trend, unlike the current REDD+ mechanism. Dividing countries into two groups corresponding to the deforestation-based instrument and the policy-based instrument helps the donor country to obtain efficient deforestation and avoided deforestation levels.
Keywords: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation; Incentives; Performance; Conditionality; Contract; Deforestation; Hidden information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01643656
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Published in Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, 2018, 51, pp.1-17. ⟨10.1016/j.reseneeco.2017.10.004⟩
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01643656
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().