 Algorithmes de prix, intelligence artificielle et équilibres collusifsPost-Print from HAL Abstract: Algorithmic pricing can help competitors to collude. Big Data, real-time pricing, and predictive analysis can allow a tacit collusion agreement and a durable equilibrium to be reached quickly. Artificial intelligence poses a specific challenge because the algorithm may autonomously discover the possible gains associated with this kind of non-aggression agreement and also because it is particularly difficult to analyse its decision-making process. Hence sanctioning this on the grounds of prohibiting anti-competitive practices is not straightforward. This paper explores the alternative ways of regulation, through audits or the implementation of liability rules. Keywords: Algorithmic Pricing; Artificial Intelligence; Tacit Collusion; Liability; antitrust enforcement; algorithmes de prix; intelligence artificielle; collusion tacite; Règles de responsabilité; mise en oeuvre des règles de concurrence (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Revue internationale de droit économique, 2017, XXXI, 2017-2, pp.83-116 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01653865 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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