Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information

Camille Cornand and Frank Heinemann

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Abstract: We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by different players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post. This process defines players' expected private values of a successful attack. The main result shows that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed and (ii) private beliefs about signals' relative precision differ sufficiently. We derive some implications for information dissemination policy. Transparency in this context is multidimensional: it concerns the publicity of announcements, the number of signals disclosed and their precision.

Keywords: Speculative attack; Coordination game; Multiple equilibria; Public and private information; Transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2009, 111 (1), pp.73-102. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01555.x⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information* (2009)
Working Paper: Speculative attacks with multiple sources of public information (2006)
Working Paper: Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information (2006)
Working Paper: Speculative Attacks with Multiple Sources of Public Information (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01704266

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2008.01555.x

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