Machiavelli before Pareto: Foxes, Lions and the Social Equilibrium as a result of a Non-logical Actions

Machiavel avant Pareto: Renards, Lions et Équilibre social comme résultat d'actions non-logiques

Ludovic Ragni () and Claire Baldin ()

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Abstract: This article examines the way Pareto addresses the dynamic of social equilibrium and the evolution of economic institutions based on the principle of rupture of the Machiavellian Moment. In the first part, we analyse why and how Pareto's categories (residues, derivation, interests and social heterogeneity, logical actions and non-logical actions) borrow from those of Machiavelli (virtù, fortuna, corruption and ordine), to define various forms of Machiavellian Moment. In the second part, we show that this borrowing allows Pareto to explain: (i) the evolution of political equilibriums, from the distinction the author makes between "Maximum of utility FOR a community in sociology" and "Maximum of ophelimity FOR a community in political economy"; and (ii) the alternative between free trade and protectionism.

Keywords: Pareto; Machiavelli; Machiavellian Moment; Social Equilibrium; Rationality; History of Economic Thought (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Published in Journal of the History of Economic Thought, In press, 41 (2), pp.187-208

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Journal Article: MACHIAVELLI BEFORE PARETO: FOXES, LIONS, AND THE SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM AS THE RESULT OF NON-LOGICAL ACTIONS (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01708579

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