Nationalization, quality and market distortion in the agroalimentary sector: A mixed-duopoly analysis
Nationalisation, qualité et distorsion marchande dans le secteur agroalimentaire: une analyse de duopole mixte
Claire Baldin ()
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Abstract:
By introducing a nationalization policy in the agroalimentary sector, we analyze the conditions in which such a regulation (i) is efficient in the market in which it is led and (ii) positively affects economic outcomes in a more global commercial framework. We develop a model of mixed duopoly in which a firm is able to select the market in which it intends to develop its activity (here, national market or foreign market) and we identify two effects, namely regulatory effect and structural effect, whose combination explains several results. We first show that the setting up of a nationalization policy is locally efficient only for high levels of horizontal product differentiation degree in the national market. We secondly highlight that such a policy is nevertheless likely to introduce market distortions and lead to suboptimal outcomes in a rather united economic framework.
Keywords: Mixed duopoly Competition Quality Nationalization Agroalimentary goods; Duopole mixte Concurrence Qualité Nationalisation Biens agroalimentaires (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04-30
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Published in Revue d'économie politique, 2018, Varia, 126 (4)
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Working Paper: Nationalization, quality and market distortion in the agroalimentary sector: A mixed-duopoly analysis (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01723739
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