La coordination par le marché dans Social Choice and Individual Values: mérites normatifs ou mérites techniques ?

Irène Berthonnet (irene.berthonnet@univ-paris-diderot.fr) and Vincent Desreumaux (vincent1.desreumaux@ed.univ-lille1.fr)
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Irène Berthonnet: LADYSS - Laboratoire Dynamiques Sociales et Recomposition des Espaces - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - UPD7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Vincent Desreumaux: CLERSÉ - Centre Lillois d’Études et de Recherches Sociologiques et Économiques - UMR 8019 - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The paper tries to clarify the status of the market in Social Choice and Individual Values. It shows how Arrow at first intended to propose a third theorem of welfare economics (Feldman [1991]), which would show that the market achieves not only Pareto-optimality, but also equitable social allocations. The impossibility theorem proves this is impossible. Arrow's solution to impossibility is interpreted here as a further limitation of the market's objectives. At the end of the book, the market is presented as a technical mechanism that guarantees economic efficiency, if it doesn't take individual values into consideration.

Keywords: impossibility theorem; welfare economics; values; social welfare function; economic efficiency; théorème d’impossibilité; économie du bien-être; fonction de bien-être social; efficacité économique (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Published in Cahiers d'Economie Politique = Papers in political economy, 2014, 66 (1), pp.95-126. ⟨10.3917/cep.066.0095⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01744985

DOI: 10.3917/cep.066.0095

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