How procedures shape substance: institutional design and antitrust evidentiary standards

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais and Jean-Philippe Tropeano

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Abstract: This paper studies the relative impact of public and private competition law enforcement on the optimal evidence threshold for antitrust liability with asymmetric information on the true type of the defendant. We also determine how to set monetary transfers (award to plaintiff and payment by defendant) in complement to the optimal standard of evidence. We obtain that stronger public enforcement always leads to a lower optimal standard of evidence. This may only enhance welfare if the information available is good enough.

Keywords: Antitrust; Public and private enforcement; Evidence; Threshold Decoupling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in European Journal of Law and Economics, 2018, 46 (1), pp.143 - 164. ⟨10.1007/s10657-018-9574-y⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: How procedures shape substance: institutional design and antitrust evidentiary standards (2018)
Working Paper: How procedures shape substance: institutional design and antitrust evidentiary standards (2018)
Working Paper: How procedures shape substance: Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards (2016)
Working Paper: How procedures shape substance: Institutional Design and Antitrust Evidentiary Standards (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01886577

DOI: 10.1007/s10657-018-9574-y

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