La régulation des contrats publics complexes de long terme à l’épreuve des imperfections informationnelles

Frédéric Marty

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Abstract: Public procurement contracts, especially long-term and complex ones, are particularly exposed to the risks induced by information incompleteness and asymmetry. These imperfections may lead to unbalanced renegotiations if not contract failures. However, these risks may be contained through award procedures and contractual choices. In the operating stage, the issue is not only related to the contractual relation management but also to its regulation. After discussing the capacity of regulation by contract models to address these issues, we envisage the case of an external regulation by successively considering the judge, a dedicated administrative taskforce, the superior bodies of public accounts supervision, and a sector-specific regulator.

Keywords: Public procurement contracts; information asymmetries; renegotiations; contract regulation; contrats publics; asymétrie d’information; renégociation; régulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11-30
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Published in Etienne Muller. La Commande publique, un levier pour l’action publique ?, Dalloz, pp.25-40, 2018, 978-2-247-17792-9

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Working Paper: La régulation des contrats publics complexes de long terme à l'épreuve des imperfections informationnelles (2017)
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