Patterns of Corruption

George Economakis, Yorgos Rizopoulos and Dimitrios Sergakis
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Yorgos Rizopoulos: LADYSS - Laboratoire Dynamiques Sociales et Recomposition des Espaces - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - UPD7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: The ambiguities that characterize the economic significance and impact of corruption make it necessary to develop a coherent and more satisfactory analytical framework. We argue that the institutional structure that governs the interactions between players and, more particularly, public and private actors is a decisive factor of corrupt practices and largely influences the nature of corruption. On this basis, we propose a taxonomy of the different corruption patterns as a function of two institutional parameters, namely the structural features of the interest intermediation systems and the degree of institutional stability.

Keywords: Corruption patterns; Institutional determinants (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01968240
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in East-West Journal of Economics and Business, 2010, pp.11 - 31

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01968240

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