Linking market capitalisation and voting pattern in corporate meetings
Marcos Vizcaíno-González and
Jérôme Caby ()
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Juan Pineiro-Chousa: USC - Universidade de Santiago de Compostela [Spain]
Marcos Vizcaíno-González: Universidade da Coruña
Jérôme Caby: IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School
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This research seeks to investigate the connection between market capitalisation and the voting pattern related to proposals about executive compensation and directors' election, using data about banks from the U.S.A. concerning the 2003-2013 period. Our findings indicate that there is a direct relationship between voting pattern and market capitalisation, suggesting that they are mutually interdependent. When the market value of the bank increases (decreases), the support given by shareholders through their votes in meetings increases (decreases) as well. Also, when the approval showed by shareholders to managerial proposals through their voting decisions gets higher (lower), the market value of the bank gets higher (lower) too.
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Published in Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, 2018, 31 (1), pp.376-385. 〈10.1080/1331677x.2018.1432405〉
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02001463
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