 Financialization and vested interests: the irrelevance of self-regulation and financial stability as a public goodPost-Print from HAL Abstract: This study proposes an institutionalist analysis of financialization through the lens of Veblen, built on some peculiar characteristics of money and related financial relations in a market-based capitalist economy. Following the case of the overcapitalization of farmlands, studied by Veblen in The Vested Interests, the analysis argues that modern capitalism is a financialized society dominated by vested interests that rely on financial liberalization-led speculative overcapitalization that often leads to a perverse accumulation process and results in systemic catastrophes. Consequently, one of the major constituent institutions of liberal finance, market-dependent self-regulation, reveals to be unable to deal with society-level issues such as financial stability. This latter must be handled at a systemic level as a public good. Therefore specific public regulation and action mechanisms must be designed to maintain society (and dominant vested-interests) within some viability limits to ensure a smooth functioning of the economy. Keywords: Financialization; financial crisis; financial regulation; institutionalism; monetary economy; public good; Thorstein Veblen (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Assa annual meetings, Allied social science associations; American economic association, Jan 2017, Chicago, United States. 12 p Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02002415 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
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