Strategic information transmission despite conflict

Stéphan Sémirat ()
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Stéphan Sémirat: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019], UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]

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Abstract: We analyze a standard Crawford and Sobel's (1982) cheap talk game in a two-dimensional framework, with uniform prior, quadratic preferences and a binary disclosure rule. Information might be credibly revealed by the Sender to the Receiver when players are able to strategically set aside their conflict. We exploit the few symmetries of the game parameters to derive multiple continua of equilibria, when varying the Sender's bias over the entire euclidean space. In particular, credible information might be revealed whatever the bias. Then we show that the equilibria exhibited characterize the game's full set of pure strategy equilibria.

Keywords: Game theory; Cheap talk game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2019, 48 (3 - September), pp.921-956. ⟨10.1007/s00182-019-00668-2⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02025268

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-019-00668-2

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