Computing approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games

Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli (), Nick Gravin and Alexander Skopalik
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Ioannis Caragiannis: CTI - Computer Technology Institute - Computer Technology Institute
Angelo Fanelli: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, C2I - Centre for Computational Intelligence [Nanyang] - NTU - Nanyang Technological University [Singapour]
Nick Gravin: C2I - Centre for Computational Intelligence [Nanyang] - NTU - Nanyang Technological University [Singapour]
Alexander Skopalik: TU Dortmund University, Germany

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Abstract: Among other solution concepts, the notion of the pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in Game Theory. Pure Nash equilibria in a game characterize situations with non-cooperative deterministic players in which no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a higher payoff. Unfortunately, it is well known that there are games that do not have pure Nash equilibria. Furhermore, even in games where the existence of equilibria is guaranteed, their computation can be a computationally hard task. Such negative results significantly question the importance of pure Nash equilibria as solution concepts that characterize the behavior of rational players. Approximate pure Nash equilibria, which characterize situations where no player can significantly improve her payoff by unilaterally deviating from her current strategy, could serve as alternative solution concepts provided that they exist and can be computed efficiently. In this letter, we discuss recent positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in congestion games.

Date: 2012-06-01
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Published in ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 2012, 11 (1), pp.26-29. ⟨10.1145/2325713.2325718⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02094375

DOI: 10.1145/2325713.2325718

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