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International Accounting Standardisation: Is Politics Back?

Alain Burlaud () and Bernard Colasse ()
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Alain Burlaud: LIRSA - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM]
Bernard Colasse: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Lacking political legitimacy, international accounting standardisation is founded on procedural and substantial legitimacies challenged by the current financial crisis. This article higlights the limits of the due process, that is, however, transparent; this process does not permit an effective participation of all stakeholders. In actuality, only those who have substantial financial and intellectual resources can afford to get inolved. Further, we discuss the weaknesses of the theoretical basis (agency theory and efficient markets theory) that supports the conceptual framework of IASB. In today's crisis context, these limits and weaknesses raise the question of a re-politization of international accounting standardisation.

Keywords: IASC; IASB; international acounting standardisation; due processe; conceptual framework; cadre conceptuel; normalisation comptable internationale; due process (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published in Accounting in Europe, 2011, 8 (1), pp.23-47. ⟨10.1080/17449480.2011.574412⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02145367

DOI: 10.1080/17449480.2011.574412

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