Private management of epidemics

Pierre Courtois, César Martínez (), Gaël Thébaud () and Mabel Tidball ()
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César Martínez: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier
Gaël Thébaud: UMR BGPI - Biologie et Génétique des Interactions Plante-Parasite - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier
Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier

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Abstract: Optimal control of epidemics is a major challenge as control is costly and damages aresubstantial. Complementing the raising literature on the topic, we focus in this paperon coordination and cooperation issues related to control strategies. Modeling an epidemicsaffecting perennial crops over space and time, we consider a dynamic game where several landowners choose whether to control an epidemics within their property. Analyzing the gameboth in a cooperative and non-cooperative fashion, we draw insights on initial conditionslikely to produce inefficiencies and coordination issues due to private management. Wecharacterize game situations according to spread intensity and infection levels and focus onlandowners strategic behaviors generating inefficiencies within a network.

Keywords: spatio-temporal model; plant epidemics; networks; coordination; decentral-ized game; Nash equilibrium; inefficiencies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09-11
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Published in 21st Annual BIOECON Conference "Inequality and poverty in biodiversity conservation and natural resource management", Sep 2019, Wageningen, Netherlands

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02283403

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