Cooperation with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility in a dynamic setting
Francisco Cabo and
Mabel Tidball ()
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Mabel Tidball: CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier
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Abstract:
: We analyze a dynamic environmental agreement between two regions. We assume that the agreement is jointly protable, because the eort associated with emission reductions is overcompensated by a cleaner environment in the future The two regions are asymmetric in two respects: their value of a cleaner environment is dierent, and they are responsible for the initial environmental problem in dierent ways. Because the benets of a cleaner environment cannot be transferred, we propose a mechanism on how to share the eorts of lowering current emissions, satisfying two main properties. The rst property is a benets pay principle: the greater one region's relative benet from cooperation, the greater must be its relative contribution. The second property is, a polluter pay principle: a region's relative contribution increases with its responsibility. Moreover, the sharing scheme must be time consistent. At any intermediate time, no country can do better by deviating from cooperation. *
Date: 2019-09-02
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Published in 3td AERNA Workshop on Game Theory and the Environment, September, Sep 2019, Valence, Spain
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Working Paper: Cooperation with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility in a dynamic setting (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02291261
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