Dynamic competition over social networks

Antoine Mandel and Xavier Venel ()
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Xavier Venel: CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement

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Abstract: We propose an analytical approach to the problem of influence maximization in a social network where two players compete by means of dynamic targeting strategies. We formulate the problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic game. We prove the existence of the uniform value: if the players are sufficiently patient, both can guarantee the same mean-average opinion without knowing the exact length of the game. Furthermore, we put forward some elements for the characterization of equilibrium strategies. In general, players must implement a trade-off between a forward-looking perspective, according to which they aim to maximize the future spread of their opinion in the network, and a backward-looking perspective, according to which they aim to counteract their opponent's previous actions. When the influence potential of players is small, we describe an equilibrium through a one-shot game based on eigenvector centrality.

Keywords: Game theory; Social network; Dynamic games; Targeting; Stochastic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01-16
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02334595v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in European Journal of Operational Research, 2020, 280 (2), pp.597-608. ⟨10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.028⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic competition over social networks (2020)
Working Paper: Dynamic competition over social networks (2020)
Working Paper: Dynamic competition over social networks (2020)
Working Paper: Dynamic competition over social networks (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02334595

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.028

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