Least Square Approximations and Linear Values of Cooperative Game

Ulrich Faigle () and Michel Grabisch

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Many important values for cooperative games are known to arise from least square optimization problems. The present investigation develops an optimization framework to explain and clarify this phenomenon in a general setting. The main result shows that every linear value results from some least square approximation problem and that, conversely, every least square approximation problem with linear constraints yields a linear value. This approach includes and extends previous results on so-called least square values and semivalues in the literature. In particular , it is demonstrated how known explicit formulas for solutions under additional assumptions easily follow from the general results presented here.

Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02381231v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Algebraic techniques and their use in describing and processing uncertainty, H. T. Nguyen and V. Kreinovich (eds), inPress

Downloads: (external link)
https://shs.hal.science/halshs-02381231v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Least Square Approximations and Linear Values of Cooperative Game (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02381231

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().