'Hybrid' competition, innovation outcomes and regulation: A duopoly model
Concurrence 'hybride', innovation et régulation: Un modèle de duopole
Thomas Le Texier () and
Ludovic Ragni ()
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Thomas Le Texier: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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Abstract:
This paper presents a duopoly model in which a commercial organization and a community compete by providing digital products while being able to share their innovation outputs to develop their own activities. The commercial organization always benefits from either a ‘closed' or an ‘open' institutional regime shift. Our numerical analysis evidences that the ‘closed' shift provides the best levels of innovation and welfare whereas it is not found to be profit-improving when product differentiation is small. This result partially qualifies the conventional idea according to which public policies may be designed to defend commercial interests rather than public ones.
Keywords: Firm; Community; Closed innovation; Open innovation; Appropriation; Firme; Communauté; Innovation fermée; Innovation ouverte (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-10-17
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Published in Séminaire GREDEG, Oct 2019, Nice, France
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02389002
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