Robust Mechanism Design: An Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Perspective

Philippe Jehiel ()

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Abstract: In this short essay, I revisit the idea of robust mechanism design explicitly taking into account that it may be hard to access the beliefs held by agents in previous plays of the mechanism. I propose modelling such an environment using the apparatus of the analogy-based expectation equilibrium with payoff-relevant analogy partitions. Such an approach allows to move away from impossibility results that arise with ex post implementation.

Date: 2019-11
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Published in Jean-François Laslier; Hervé Moulin; M. Remzi Sanver; William S. Zwicker. The Future of Economic Design, Springer, pp.321-325, 2019, ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_44⟩

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Working Paper: Robust Mechanism Design: An Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium Perspective (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02491939

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_44

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