On the usefulness of envy-freeness in a "welfarist" approach of justice

De l'utilité de l'absence d'envie dans une approche "welfariste" de la justice

Claude Gamel

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Abstract: In the "welfarist" approach of normative economics issued from the utilitarian tradition, the envy-freeness criterion may overcome the fundamental debate between "old" and "new" welfare economics. Owing to the notion of "intrapersonal" utility comparisons, economic theory is advancing through the deep question of social justice, specially about the definition of equality of opportunity. Nevertheless, in the envy-freeness theory of justice, everyone gets only the "position" of other people, without identifying oneself with their "character"; from an ethical point of view, this attitude is a restrictive one, in comparison with the idea of perfect procedural justice, which is nowadays explored by social philosophy.

Keywords: social justice; envy-freeness; welfarism; intrapersonal utility comparisons; equality of opportunity; justice sociale; non-envie; welfarisme; comparaisons intra-personnelles d'utilité; égalité des chances (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994
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Published in Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, 1994, 60 (1), pp.73-79

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02519686

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