The "fact-value" distinction in economics: Three main times of a chequered history

La distinction "fait/valeur" en théorie économique: trois temps fondamentaux d'une histoire mouvementée

Claude Gamel

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Abstract: According to Putnam (2004, chapters 3 and 4), Sen's present-day works can illustrate his own thesis on facts and values as closely interwoven objects; he also thinks that Sen's works open a "second phase of classical economics" in which the fact-value distinction is abandoned. The reach of this thesis has to be evaluated in the long story which connects the economic theory to the very sensitive question of the value judgments. First of all, we have to summarize the oldest episodes (1); then the discussion continued throughout the XX° century within the closed field of normative economics, where the contributions of Robbins (1932), Arrow (1951) and Rawls (1971) are to be emphasized (2). In this prospect, by using the recent example of Sen's "capabilities approach", it seems that a different and selective treatment of value judgments remains indispensable to the fruitfulness of the whole economic theory (3).

Keywords: fact-value distinction; normative economics; welfare economics; collective choice; post-welfarism; capabilities approach; distinction fait/valeur; économie normative; économie du bien-être; choix collectif; post-welfarisme; approche par les capacités (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Published in Analisi e Diritto 2008, 2009, pp.135-153

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02529894

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