How Do Central Bank Governors Matter? Regulation and the Financial Sector

Prachi Mishra and Ariell Reshef ()
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Prachi Mishra: International Monetary Fund - International Monetary Fund
Ariell Reshef: PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CEPII - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales - Centre d'analyse stratégique, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Do past employment characteristics of central bank governors affect financial regulation? To answer this question, we construct a new data set based on curriculum vitae of all central bank governors around the world in 1970–2011. We interpret work experiences as indicators of preferences toward deregulation. Over the average duration in office (5.6 years), a governor with financial sector experience is associated with three times more deregulation than a governor without experience in finance. Similar results hold for past experience at the IMF; in contrast, past experience at the BIS and the UN are associated with less deregulation.

Keywords: Central bank; Central bank governor; Leaders; Financial regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Published in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2019, 51 (2-3), pp.369-402. ⟨10.1111/jmcb.12578⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02973367

DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.12578

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