Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy

Jean-Bernard Chatelain and Kirsten Ralf

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Abstract: A minimal central bank credibility, with a non-zero probability of not renegning his commitment ("quasi-commitment"), is a necessary condition for anchoring inflation expectations and stabilizing inflation dynamics. By contrast, a complete lack of credibility, with the certainty that the policy maker will renege his commitment ("optimal discretion"), leads to the local instability of inflation dynamics. In the textbook example of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, the response of the policy instrument to inflation gaps for optimal policy under quasi-commitment has an opposite sign than in optimal discretion, which explains this bifurcation.

Keywords: Imperfect commitment; Discretion; New-Keynesian Phillips curve; Imperfect credibility; Ramsey optimal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Revue Economique, 2021, 72 (1), pp.43-63. ⟨10.3917/reco.721.0043⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy (2021)
Working Paper: Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy (2021)
Working Paper: Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy (2021)
Working Paper: Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy (2020)
Working Paper: Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy (2018)
Working Paper: Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03029892

DOI: 10.3917/reco.721.0043

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