Approval voting without ballot restrictions

Federica Ceron () and Stéphane Gonzalez ()
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Federica Ceron: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We axiomatically study voting rules without making any assumption on the ballots that voters are allowed to cast. In this setting, we characterize the family of "endorsement rules," which includes approval voting and the plurality rule, via the imposition of three normative conditions. The first condition is the well known social-theoretic principle of consistency; the second one, unbiasedness, roughly requires social outcomes not to be biased toward particular candidates or voters; the last one, dubbed no single voter overrides, demands that the addition of a voter to an electorate cannot radically change the social outcome. Building on this result, we provide the first axiomatic characterization of approval voting without the approval balloting assumption. The informational basis of approval voting as well as its aggregative rationale are jointly derived from a set of conditions that can be defined on most of the ballot spaces studied in the literature.

Date: 2021
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03034164v1
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Published in Theoretical Economics, 2021, 16 (3), pp.759-775. ⟨10.3982/TE4087⟩

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Working Paper: Approval voting without ballot restrictions (2021)
Working Paper: Approval voting without ballot restrictions (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03034164

DOI: 10.3982/TE4087

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