The Impact of Family Control and Internal Governance Mechanisms on Dividend Policy: The Case of Companies Listed on the Moroccan Stock Market

El impacto del control familiar y los mecanismos de gobierno interno en la política de dividendos: el caso de las empresas que cotizan en la bolsa de valores marroquí

Adil El Mallouky and Khalid Elouafa
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Adil El Mallouky: INREDD - Innovation, Responsabilités et Développement Durable - UCA - Université Cadi Ayyad [Marrakech]
Khalid Elouafa: INREDD - Innovation, Responsabilités et Développement Durable - UCA - Université Cadi Ayyad [Marrakech]

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Abstract: The purpose of this work is to examine the determinants of the dividend distribution policy, more particularly we will highlight the effect of the involvement of family shareholders in the company and the internal governance mechanisms on the dividend payment decisions of companies listed on the Moroccan stock exchange. To answer our research questions, we used a TOBIT model estimate based on a sample of 160 observations per year-listed company over the period 2015-2018. The results of this study indicate anegative relationship between family ownership and the dividend payout ratio. In addition, the presence of a family CEO has a negative effect on the level of dividenddistributed. In contrast,we note that the use of control mechanisms by pyramid structures does not have a significant impact on dividend distribution. In terms of the effect of the characteristics of governance mechanisms on dividend payments, we find a positive association between the presence of a second institutional block holder and dividend distribution. We also find a negative relationship between the duality of the board of directors and the distribution of dividends, while the presence of independent directors on the boardof directors has no significant impact on the distribution ofdividends.

Keywords: politique de distribution de dividendes; implication de l’actionnariat familial; mécanismes de gouvernance; conflits d’agence.; dividend policy; involvement of family shareholders; corporate governance mechanisms; agency conflicts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara and nep-cfn
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Published in International Journal of Accounting, Finance, Auditing, Management and Economics, 2020, 1 (3), pp.212-229. ⟨10.5281/zenodo.4282171⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03168366

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4282171

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