When the state does not play dice: aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance

Luigi Mittone, Matteo Ploner and Eugenio Verrina

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Abstract: We experimentally test the effect of aggressive audit strategies on tax compliance. Taxpayers first go through a phase of audits managed by a human tax agent who is requested to follow a rule imposed by a fair random device. However, the tax agent can freely decide to break the rule and over-inspect. Afterward, taxpayers are exposed to a genuinely random audit process governed by an algorithm, which makes compliance a strategically dominated option. We find that taxpayers are generally over-inspected by the human tax agents and react to this with nearly full compliance. Our main result is that these high levels of compliance also persist when controls are implemented by the algorithm. This suggests that tax authorities can use aggressive audit strategies to raise and sustain tax compliance.

Date: 2021-04-07
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Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, ⟨10.1007/s00355-021-01325-y⟩

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Journal Article: When the state does not play dice: aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance (2021)
Working Paper: When the State Doesn't Play Dice: Aggressive Audit Strategies Foster Tax Compliance (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03240743

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01325-y

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