Hybrid’ competition, innovation outcomes and regulation: A duopoly model
Concurrence 'hybride', innovation et régulation: un modèle de duopole biface
Thomas Le Texier () and
Ludovic Ragni ()
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Thomas Le Texier: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UR - Université de Rennes
Ludovic Ragni: GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur, COMUE UCA - COMUE Université Côte d'Azur (2015-2019)
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Abstract:
This paper presents a duopoly model in which a commercial organization and a community compete by providing digital products while being able to share their innovation outputs to develop their own activities. The commercial organization always benefits from either a ‘closed' or an ‘open' institutional regime shift. Our numerical analysis evidences that the ‘closed' shift provides the best levels of innovation and welfare whereas it is not found to be profit-improving when product differentiation is small. This result partially qualifies the conventional idea according to which public policies may be designed to defend commercial interests rather than public ones.
Keywords: firm; community; closed innovation; open innovation; appropriation; : firme; communauté; innovation fermée; innovation ouverte (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06-01
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Published in Revue internationale des économistes de langue française, 2021, Vol. 5 (1), pp.222-241
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03242073
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