Does voting on tax fund destination imply a direct democracy effect?

Nicolas Jacquemet, Stéphane Luchini and Antoine Malézieux
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Stéphane Luchini: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Does giving taxpayers a voice over the destination of tax revenues lead to more honest income declarations? Previous experiments have shown that giving participants the opportunity to select the organization that receives their tax funds tends to increase tax compliance. The aim of this paper is to assess whether this increase in compliance is induced by the sole fact of giving subjects a choice—a "direct democracy effect". To that aim, we ask participants to a tax evasion game to choose, in a collective or individual choice setting, between two very similar organizations which provide the same social (ecological) benefits. We elicit compliance for both organizations before the choice is made so as to control for the counter-factual compliance decision. We find that democracy does not increase compliance, and even observe a slight negative effect—in particular for women. Our results confirm the existence of a commitment effect of democracy, leading to favor more the selected organization when it was actively chosen. The commitment effect of democracy is however not enough to overcome the decrease in the level of compliance. Thanks to response times data, we show that prior choice on similar options as compared to a purely random selection weakens the preference for honesty. One important field application of our results is that democracy in tax spending must offer real choices to tax payers to improve compliance.

Keywords: Commitment; Direct democracy effect; Voting; Tax evasion game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-isf, nep-iue and nep-pol
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03277339
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, 2021, 67, ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2021.106003⟩

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Journal Article: Does voting on tax fund destination imply a direct democracy effect? (2021)
Working Paper: Does voting on tax fund destination imply a direct democracy effect? (2021)
Working Paper: Does voting on tax fund destination imply a direct democracy effect? (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03277339

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.106003

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