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Team versus Individual Reputations: a Model of Interaction and some Empirical Evidence

Olivier Gergaud and Florine Livat
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Florine Livat: OMI - Organisation Marchandes et Institutions - URCA - Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne

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Abstract: How do individuals, goods or services (e.g. researchers) through their own reputation give birth to a group's reputation (e.g. a laboratory) and conversely how do they take advantage of this group's reputation. Do they contribute to (derive benefit from) the group's reputation proportionally to their individual reputation or in a different way? To answer these questions we develop in this paper a theoretical model in which collective reputation both determines and is determined -simultaneously- by individual reputations as suggested first by Tirole (1996). This paper also proposes an empirical strategy to assess both umbrella impacts (the impact of a collective reputation on a given individual reputation) and contributions to the umbrella (the contrary). Then, the theoretical model is applied to the case of Bordeaux wines from a rich dataset on individual opinions.

Keywords: Cultural goods; Collective Reputation; Individual Reputation; Réputation individuelle; Réputation collective; Biens culturels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-02
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03280777
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in 2004

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Working Paper: Team versus Individual Reputations: a Model of Interaction and some Empirical Evidence (2004) Downloads
Working Paper: Team versus individual reputations: a model of interaction and some empirical evidence (2004) Downloads
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