Market Structure and Insider Trading

Wassim Daher and Leonard Mirman

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Abstract: In this paper we examine the real and financial effects of two insiders trading in a static Jain-Mirman model (Henceforth JM). The first insider is the manager of the firm. The second insider is the owner. First, we study the change of the linear-equilibrium variables, in the presence of two insiders. Specifically, we show that the trading order and the real output of the manager are less in this model than in JM model. Secondly, we show that the stock price reveals more information than in Cournot duopoly and monopoly models studied by Jain-Mirman. Finally, we analyze the comparative statics (insiders' profits) of this model, when the market maker receives one or two signals.

Keywords: Insider Trading; Stock prices; Correlated signals; Kyle model; agent informé; prix du stock; signaux corrélés; modèle de Kyle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-03
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-03322686
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in 2004

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Related works:
Journal Article: Market structure and insider trading (2007)
Working Paper: Market Structure and Insider Trading (2004)
Working Paper: Market structure and insider trading (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03322686

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